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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how digital innovation develops in ecologies of distributed heterogeneous actors 
with contesting logics, diverse technologies and various forms of orchestrations. Drawing on the insights 
from the emerging theory of digital innovation augmented by an institutional logics perspective, we study 
how over 20 years residential Internet infrastructure was coshaped by the interplay of self-organized 
residential communities, corporate Internet service providers (ISPs), and a state ISP. Our analysis led to 
the identification of four types of interactions that shape the trajectories of digital infrastructure 
development which  are beyond direct actor interplays and competition or collaboration relationships. We 
label these interactions as symbiotic generative, symbiotic mutualistic, parasitic complementary, and 
parasitic competitive  and explain the processes and conditions of their development as well as their 
innovation outcomes. Drawing on these findings, we develop a model of symbiotic and parasitic 
interactions shaping digital infrastructure development and identify key characteristics of the ecologies 
where these emerge. Our study contributes to the growing field of research on complex and nonlinear 
paths of digital innovation development constituted by the dynamics of its distributed agency and 
concludes by highlighting avenues for future research in this area. 
 
Keywords: digital innovation, infrastructure, symbiotic and parasitic interactions, ecology of games, 
communities 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies on digital innovations (DI) in technologies and infrastructures have highlighted distinctive 
properties and dynamics of these development processes. Such innovations, in particular, develop by 
distributed collectives of unprompted sets of actors (Dougherty and Dunne 2011; Lyytinen et al. 2016; 
Nambisan et al. 2017; Yoo 2013), which build on diverse and often contesting logics of organizing and 
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technology framings (Barrett et al. 2013; Berente and Yoo 2012; Garud et al. 2013; Hultin and Mähring 
2014) and interact in both synchronized and orchestrated but also in emergent and serendipitous manners 
(Boland et al. 2007; Garud et al. 2008; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). The complexities of DI development 
processes have led researchers to call for studies that shed light on the non-linear dynamics of distributed 
DI agency (e.g., Nambisan et al. 2017; Oborn et al. 2019; Tilson et al. 2010) and suggest the value of 
ecological perspectives in this regard  (e.g., Dougherty and Dunne 2011; Lyytinen et al. 2016).  
Across disciplines, ecological perspectives generally assume a multiplicity of heterogeneous 
actors with complex symbiotic and parasitic relationships. These relationships are not simply 
cooperation/competition-driven, as they can be mutually beneficial (e.g., flowers and bees), beneficial to 
only one side (e.g., spruces that benefit from neighboring trees that protect them from the sun and cold), 
or parasitic (e.g., leeches and viruses that feed off of and degrade other organisms). Such relationships 
also change dynamically over time (e.g., spruces that compete for nutrients with the trees that protected 
them), coevolve YLD³SUHKHQVLEOHRSSRUWXQLVWLFUHDG\WR\RNHXQOLNHO\SDUWQHUV´+DUDZD\S, 
and have ecological impacts beyond direct actor interactions (Margulis and Sagan 2007).  
Previous studies have begun to examine how DI develops in ecologies of heterogenous actors 
which rely on orchestrated and deliberate actions (Dougherty and Dunne 2011). However, our knowledge 
on the development of DI in less orchestrated ecologies, where actors rely on serendipity, improvisation 
and opportunism (Oborn et al . 2019) or deal with various temporal, resource, capability and spatial 
asynchronies (e.g. Ansari and Garud 2008; Garud et al. 2013; Oborn 2019), has remained undertheorized. 
Furthermore, while research has discussed how multi-actor DI unfolds under the umbrella of particular 
technology projects (Boland et al. 2007; Oborn et al. 2019; Tuertscher et al. 2013) we know less about DI 
development in ecologies where actors use diverse technologies.  
To address these gaps, this paper complements research on the diverse logics of actors in IT 
development (e.g., Barrett et al. 2013; Constantinides and Barrett 2015; Berente and Yoo 2012; Gawer 
and Phillips 2013; Hultin and Mahring 2014) with the insights from growing studies on digital innovation 
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and digital infrastructure development (Boland et al. 2007; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Lyytinen et al. 
2016; Nambisan et al. 2017; Oborn et al. 2019; Tuertscher et al. 2014; Yoo et al. 2012). Based on the 
insights, we describe how heterogenous actors in Belarus, such as self-organized residential communities, 
corporate Internet service providers (ISPs), and a monopolist state Internet service provider (ISP), 
developed Internet infrastructures while following diverse logics and technologies and operating under  
various changing degrees of orchestration. Our findings reveal four types of symbiotic and parasitic 
interactions that help explain the distinctive paths of DI development in such complex ecology. We label 
the identified types of interactions as symbiotic generative, symbiotic mutualistic, parasitic 
complementary, and parasitic competitive and explain the processes and conditions of their development 
as well as their innovation outcomes. 
Our findings make several valuable contributions to our knowledge on DI development. 
First, our findings on symbiotic and parasitic interactions extend existing knowledge on diverse 
forms of interactions within the distributed DI agency (Boland et al. 2007; Lyytinen et al. 2016; 
2¶0DKRQ\DQG%HFN\7XHUWVFKHUHWDO6HFRQGZHLGHQWLI\DQGGHWDLOWKHSURFHVVHV
shaping characteristics, and innovation outcomes for each type of the identified interactions and 
develop a model of symbiotic and parasitic interactions shaping DI developments. These insights 
might be generalizable to the development of other DI (e.g. blockchain, Internet of things, digital 
platforms) that assume interactions of multiple actors with diverse institutional logics and 
multiple technologies. Third, our study is among the first to examine the interplay of multiple 
technologies in the DI development by highlighting how DI might successfully develop via 
various combinations of digital technologies with diverse degrees of confluence. In this regard, 
our findings contribute to understanding the role of technology in DI development (e.g. Boland 
et al. 2007; Nambisan et al. 2017E\LOOXVWUDWLQJWKDWDFWRUV¶ multiple diverse technologies enable 
various and often unlikely technology combinations that  act as a gateways integrating 
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innovative developments from heterogenous actors into a DI that would be unlikely to emerge 
around single technology. Forth, our study is among the first to incorporate institutional logics 
into the analysis of DI development and suggests both its value and novel insights. Thus while 
previous studies have discussed that actor logics enable and constrain actors in building on 
certain rules and resources (Berente and Yoo 2012; Carlile 2002; Garud et al. 2013; Hultin and 
Mähring 2014), our findings illustrate that the interplay of multiple diverse technologies provides 
DI actors with insights into rules and access to resources beyond the repertoires afforded by their 
dominant logics.   
The following sections begin with a review of existing research on DI agency and its interaction 
dynamics, noting gaps in our knowledge and providing a background to study the shaping of DI 
innovation within ecologies of multiple heterogenous actors that operate on multiple technologies. We 
then describe the details of our methodological approach, the research setting, and our research findings. 
The article concludes with a proposed model of symbiotic and parasitic interactions shaping DI 
development and a discussion of theoretical and practical implications of our findings along with their 
limitations and areas for future research. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
DI in general and digital infrastructures3 in particular are characterized by unique openness to number and 
types of users (Monteiro et al. 2014; Nambisan et al. 2017) as well as ³the number and heterogeneity of 
included components, relations, and their dynamic and unexpected interactions´Hanseth and Lyytinen 
2010, p. 1). The development of these digital artifacts occurs in emergent collectives of  multiple, 
 
 
3
 A) The literature has used multiple terms, including information infrastructure, IT infrastructure, e-infrastructure, 
HWF)ROORZLQJ+HQIULGVVRQDQG%\JVWDG¶VDQDO\VLVRIYDULHW\RILQIUDVWUXFWXUHVWXGLHVZHXVH³GLJLWDO
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH´WKURXJKRXWWKHSDSHU%:KLOHUHVHDUFKRQGLJLWDOLQQRYDWLRQDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVWXGLHVDUHWZR
distinctive areas, studies in both streams often refer to infrastructures as constituted by digital innovations (e.g., see 
Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Nambisan et al. 2017; Yoo et al. 2010). 
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continuously evolving, and heterogeneous actors with different logics and capabilities (Boland et al. 2007; 
Lyytinen et al. 2016; Nambisan et al. 2017; Tuomi 2002; Yoo et al. 2012). In this regard, Nambisan et al. 
(2017, p. 225) define DI agency as distributed, i.e., a ³FROOHFWLRQRIDFWRUVZLWKGLYHUVHJRDOVDQG
motives²often outside the control of the primary innovator« [who] can opt in and out while their goals 
FKDQJHQHZFRPSHWHQFLHVDUHQHHGHG«QHZFRQVWUDLQWVDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHVHPHUJHRUYDU\LQJ
FRQWULEXWLRQVEHFRPHUHFRJQL]HG´Most relevant to our knowledge on DI development by distributed DI 
agency with multiple logics and technologies are studies that discuss the role of actor logics, the role of 
technology, and the dynamics multi-actor interactions.   
The Role of Logics in DI Development 
The distributed nature of DI agency implies an extended diversity of meanings attached to developing 
innovations (Abbate 2000; Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Hepsø et al. 2009). These different 
meanings, conceptualized by a variety of terms, such as ideologies, frames, and logics (Barrett et al. 2013; 
Berente and Yoo 2012; Gawer and Phillips 2013; Orlikowski and Gash 1994), provide distinct 
understandings of how a technology works and may be used (Abbate 2000; Hultin and Mähring 2014; 
Orlikowski and Gash 1994). $FWRUV¶GLIIHUHQWPHDQLQJVinform innovation processes since they enable or 
constrain actors capabilities and resources (Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Tuomi 2002), and might lead 
to conflicts (Carlile 2002; Lyytinen et al. 2016; Raymond 1999; Tuomi 2002), complex coadaptation 
strategies (West and O'Mahony 2008), and legitimacy risks (Barrett et al. 2013; Garud et al. 2002). 
7KLVSDSHUDGGUHVVHVWKHFDOOVWRLQFRUSRUDWHWKHLQWHUSOD\RIGLYHUVHDFWRUV¶PHDQLQJVWRWKH
analysis of development of digital infrastructures (Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Hanseth and 
Monteiro 1997; Sahay et al. 2009; Schultze and Bhappu 2017). We build on an institutional logics 
perspective as a metatheoretical and multilevel framing for analyzing the interrelationships among 
heterogenous actors such as institutions, individuals, and organizations (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Thornton et al. 2012). We define institutional logics as ³the socially constructed historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
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their material subsistence, and provide meaning to their social UHDOLW\´(Thornton and Ocasio 1999, p. 
804). For instance, free and open-source software communities follow community logics, based on trust 
and commitment to reciprocity, unity of will, commitment to community values of shared resources and 
intellectual property rights, group membership, and reliance on social capital as a coordinator (Barrett et 
al. 2013; O'Mahony and Lakhani 2011; Raymond 1999; Thornton et al. 2012). Community logics are 
distinct from market logics, where actors seek to maximize their profit and rely on price and economic 
transactions to coordinate their behavior (Eisenmann 2008; Thornton et al. 2012), and also from state 
logics, where the state is a source of rules and goals and a distribution mechanism for resources, and 
ZKHUHEDFNURRPSROLWLFVDQGEXUHDXFUDWLFUXOHVJXLGHDFWRUV¶EHKDYLRU (Dunn and Jones 2010; Lounsbury 
2007; Ouchi 1980; Thornton et al. 2012).  
Since institutional logic instantiate in the technology (Gawer and Phillips 2013) actors with 
different logics will develop different technologies or use these differently adapting or neglecting certain 
features (Berente and Yoo 2012). In turn, change in the material practices of innovation conditions the 
evolution of actorV¶LQVWLWXWLRQDOORJLFs (Berente and Yoo 2012; Gawer and Phillips 2013; Hultin and 
Mähring 2014).  
At the same time, the interplay of binary logics is prioritized over insights into the interplay of 
multiple logics (Schultze and Bhappu 2017) and the role of community logics has been overlooked in 
organizational theory and institutional logics studies (ThornWRQHWDO2¶0DKRQ\DQG/DNKDQL
2011). This is an important gap in the context of DI, where there is a lack of studies on how different 
DFWRUV¶ORJLFVLQWHUDFWLQWKHLQWHUSOD\RIFROOHFWLYHVVKDSLQJ',Nambisan et al. 2017) and where 
research calls for more studies on how digital infrastructures are shaped by heterogeneous actors with 
asymmetrical power, resources, and contested meanings (Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Edwards et al. 
2009; Hanseth and Monteiro 1997; Sanner et al. 2014). 
The Role of Technology in DI Development 
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The literature on DI and digital infrastructures has highlighted that technology helps coordinate 
interactions and contributions from heterogeneous actors (Boland et al. 2007; Oborn et al. 2019; 
O'Mahony and Lakhani 2011; Tuomi 2002). An important specificity of digital instrastructure is that it 
can grow by building on not only tightly coupled architectures with highly integrated innovative 
developments but also when building on loosely coupled and integrated developments (Henfridsson and 
Bygstad 2013; Tiwana et al. 2010). In this way,7FDQEHFRPHD³ERXQGDU\REMHFW´IRUGLYHUVHDQG
FRQWLQXRXVO\HYROYLQJDFWRUV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV%RODQGHWDO/\\WLQHQHWDO1DPELVDQHWDO
2017; Thornton et al. 2012; Tuomi 2002) or D³WUDGLQJ]RQH´ (Boland et al. 2007) where alternative 
beliefs and different knowledge bases of multiple actors are negotiated. IT can also act as an orchestration 
tool that connects contributions from heterogenous actors by matching those with solutions to those with 
problems (e.g., the Uber algorithm) (Afuah and Tucci 2012; Nambisan et al. 2017).  
The above studies have generated valuable insights for understanding the role of technology for 
coordination of heterogenous DI actors. However, their focus has been centered on DI developing under 
the umbrella of particular kinds of technologies and services such as 3D CAD/CAM systems in 
architecture, engineering, and construction industries (Boland et al. 2007), mobile money payment 
services (Oborn et al. 2019), and a particle detector system (Tuertscher et al. 2013). This creates an 
important gap in our knowledge about the paths of DI development through  the interplay of multiple and 
diverse technologies.  
Multi-Actor Interactions Shaping DI Development 
Research has begun to examine forms of interactions within the distributed DI agency (Boland et al. 
/\\WLQHQHWDO2¶0DKRQ\DQG%HFN\7XHUWscher et al. 2014). For example, Lyytinen et 
al. (2016) discuss anarchic networks where innovative contributions and resources of heterogeneous 
actors become dynamically identified and mobilized under an umbrella of a common innovation project 
but in the absence of hierarchical control&RPSOH[LQQRYDWLRQSURMHFWVVXFKDV)UDQN*HKU\¶V
construction projects (Boland et al. 2007) or the creation of a particle detector at CERN (Tuertscher et al. 
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2014), provide a common ground where distinct emergent contributions of multiple actors become 
unpredictably interwoven. For example, Boland et al. (2007) discuss how heterogenous firms interacting  
under a common project produced multiple distinct innovations that occasionally interacted with each 
other and fed back into the project, stimulating further innovations in a staccato fashion.  
Gulati et al. (2012, p. 7) propose a concept of meta-organization to account for multiactor 
QHWZRUNVZKHUH³HDFKDJHQWKDVLWVRZQPRWLYDWLRQVLQFHQWLYHVDQGFRJQLWLRQV«DPXOWLWXGHRI
individual organisms that coexist, collaborate, and co-evolve via a complex set of symbiotic and 
UHFLSURFDOUHODWLRQVKLSVZKLFKWRJHWKHUIRUPDODUJHURUJDQLVP´0HWD-organization generates a mutually 
profitable ecosystem where participants might use material, cognitive, network, or legitimate resources 
from outside their boundaries by orchestrating or cultivating the behavior of their partners. Such 
symbiotic ecosystems can make the behavior of heterogenous actors highly coadaptive, such as when big 
software companies like IBM, Apple or Oracle integrate OSS software into their products, cultivate OSS 
communities, and encourage their personnel to participate in these (Gulati et al. 2012; Lakhani and 
Panetta 2007) or when industry and community actors with divergent interests collaborate through the 
FUHDWLRQRIDERXQGDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQ2¶0DKRQH\DQG%HFN\Reflecting a multiplicity of actors 
with diverse loci of control, contemporary digital infrastructures increasingly follow a complex canvas of 
mesh networks, where some components have centralized control, while others are decentralized (Rodon 
and Silva 2015), or rely on tight control while being flexible (Lyytinen et al. 2016; Tilson et al. 2010a). 
While previous studies have emphasized the importance of orchestrating and coordinating 
contributions of heterogeneous DI actors (Dougherty and Dunne 2015; Henfridsson and Yoo 2014; 
Nambisan et al. 2017), our knowledge on DI developing via less orchestrated interactions has remained 
relatively limited (Oborn et al. 2019). Low degrees of orchestration between DI actors might occur due to 
diverse rhythms on which the DI infrastructures, resources, capabilities, and participating actors develop 
and operate (Ansari and Garud 2009; Garud et al. 2013), as well as asynchronies between the global and 
local innovation spaces (Oborn et al. 2019). Specifically, low degrees of orchestration might condition a 
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variety of complex indirect and not necessarily reciprocal actor interplays that have remained largely 
undertheorized. For example, DI actors might develop alternative innovations for unaddressed or 
excluded users as solutions that co-exist in parallel, not directly interacting markets (Jack and Suri 2011; 
Morawczynski and Pickens 2009; Sahay et al. 2009; Van Oost et al. 2009). Moreover, the orchestrated 
relationships change over time (Aanestad and Jensen 2011; Ansari and Garud 2009; Tilson et al. 2010a), 
such as when initial collaboration interactions develop into threatening ones (Constantinides and Barrett 
2014; Sahay et al. 2009) or when centralized and tightly coupled networks evolve into a more loosely 
coupled system (Rodon and Silva 2015). Finally, the unavoidable deviation of actor interactions from 
deliberate to serendipitous, improvised and opportunistic requires investigation of non-orchestrated DI 
paths (Oborn et al. 2019).  
To summarize, research on DI and digital infrastructures has made significant steps forward in 
understanding the role of actor logics, technology, and interaction dynamics during DI development. 
However,  actor interactions that take place within less orchestrated ecologies and build on multiple 
contesting logics and diverse technologies have remained undertheorized.  
 
METHOD 
This analysis is anchored in a longitudinal case study of residential Internet infrastructure development in 
Minsk, the capital of Belarus. Several reasons underpin this choice of this case (Siggelkow 2007). First, 
the focal phenomenon is ultimately the unfolding of digital infrastructure over 23 years (1994±2017), 
which is nationally bounded but also parallels infrastructure that has developed across the world. Tracing 
the longitudinal development of Internet infrastructure over a 20-year time horizon was particularly 
valuable for investigating the ecological interplays between multiple heterogeneous and continuously 
evolving innovation collectives (Nambisan et al. 2017; Tilson et al. 2010b; Yoo et al. 2012). Second, the 
development of residential Internet infrastructure in Belarus reached a relatively high level, being 
considered one of the top ten countries worldwide for speed of IT development (ITU 2016; Rybik 2012; 
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Seklickiy 2000; Zabrodskaya 2013) and also providing one of the ZRUOG¶Vmost affordable Internet 
services relative to GNI per capita (ITU 2014, 2016) (see Figure 1). 
--- Insert Figure 1 here ---- 
Third, since Internet infrastructure in Minsk was cocreated by communities, corporate and state-
owned ISPs, and government, the setting enabled us to study an innovation constituted by multiple 
heterogeneous actors (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010; Tuomi 2002) with diverse contesting logics, including 
WKHXQGHUWKHRUL]HGFRPPXQLW\ORJLFV7KRUVWRQHWDO2¶0DKRQH\DQG/DNKDQL. The 
heterogenous actors also operated on distinct goals and power positions (Constantinides and Barrett 2014; 
Nambisan et al. 2017; Sahay et al. 2009), and diverse technologies. In this case, communities, called 
HomeNets, were among the core actors in this process. These emerged in the mid-1990s as communities 
of residents who linked their home computers together with cables and other equipment to create an 
initially offline version of a local Internet. Starting from the 2000s, they cocreated residential Internet 
infrastructures with corporate ISPs and became among the largest and most vibrant online communities in 
the country, with more than 800 HomeNets, each with between several hundred and several thousand 
members, with 22,000 users registered at the national HomeNet website (Figure 2). HomeNets also 
became the major means for residential Internet access as residential areas became literally entangled with 
cables (Figure 3). Starting from 2010, some HomeNets developed into successful ISPs themselves. The 
case therefore provided an opportunity to investigate how bottom-up and top-down efforts to build 
infrastructure as well as tightly and loosely coupled infrastructures coexist and interact dynamically when 
being coshaped by heterogeneous actors over time (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Rodon and Silva 
2015). 
--- Insert Figure 2 here --- 
--- Insert Figure 3 here --- 
Data collection. This study relied on in-depth interviews, documents and archival data. Ninety-
seven interviews (40 minutes each on average, ranging from 20 minutes to 3.5 hours; 80 perecnt audio-
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recorded and transcribed verbatim) were conducted as part of an unpublished PhD dissertation by the lead 
author (July 2010±April 2011) and a subsequent updating study (November±December 2016) focused on 
targeting an extended set of actors (ISPs, Beltelecom, experts in the field, HomeNets ISPs) and their 
interrelationships. Out of 97 interviews, 89 were conducted face to face, five by phone and three by 
Skype. Interviews with HomeNet members focused on how and why they developed and built up their 
infrastructures, how these changed over time, and what relationships they developed with ISPs and 
government bodies. Interviews with ISPs focused on how they developed collaborative relationships with 
HomeNets and other ISPs as well as how they developed technologies for residential Internet access, how 
these evolved over time and the nature of their relationships with the government and Beltelecom. 
Interviews with Beltelecom focused on how the company developed residential Internet access over time, 
and its relationships with ISPs, HomeNets and government. Finally, interviews with HomeNet ISPs 
focused on how they evolved from HomeNets, the services that they provided and competed on over the 
years, and their relationships with other ISPs and HomeNet ISPs. Appendix A provides samples of 
interview questionnaires for each type of actor in each phase of the study and Table 1 provides details on 
the interviews and respondents. 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
To enhance the reliability of the interviews (due to legal restrictions imposed by the government 
on HomeNets since 2010) we used a snowball sampling method for locating hard-to-reach populations 
(Biernacki and Waldorf 1981; Goodman 2011; Heckathorn 2011). Because HomeNets were constantly 
evolving (Faraj et al. 2011; Faraj et al. 2016), with multiple individual communities growing and merging 
with one another, we considered the set of HomeNets as one actor. We controlled data sampling to ensure 
representation of the whole set of HomeNets, despite their variety (in terms of size, time of creation, and 
city area). This decision was supported by our analysis, which revealed similar actions and organizing 
principles across HomeNets. For example, they pursued remarkably similar goals and strategies. 
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The study also incorporated analysis of various secondary data sources (listed in Table B1 in 
Appendix B), including a variety of  HomeNet accounting records, statutes,  maps of users and 
infrastructures, photos and videos, news and blogs about their practices, development, and services; 
books, research articles and government laws and regulations related to Internet development, statistical 
indicators (e.g., number of Internet users, home computers, average salary), news portals and websites 
specializing in IT and Internet development since 2000; official ISP websites.  
Systematic procedures were used to safeguard the study from any retrospective biases (Golden 
1992, 1997; Huber and Power 1985), including the collection of data from multiple respondents with 
diverse backgrounds, triangulating data sources to capture the accurate unfolding of formal and informal 
processes, and structuring interviews around major events and observation of the actual behavior of 
actors. The interviews were spread over a period of six years that minimized the potential for a particular 
VLQJOHHYHQWRIWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶SDVW to determine their views. In addition, tKHFDVHQDUUDWLYHDQGDFWRUV¶
case descriptions were revisited through clarifying interviews with nine participants from each of the 
corresponding groups (e.g., three with HomeNets; two with ISPs; three with HomeNet ISPs and one with 
Beltelecom), ensuring that potential inconsistences and the retrospective biases were minimized. 
Data analysis. Our analysis followed an ³DEGXFWLYH´process (Hanson 1958; Kelle 1995; Peirce 
1958; Richardson and Kramer 2006), aiming to explain new and surprising empirical data through the 
elaboration of the relevant concepts from the literature review (Kelle 1995; Thietart 2016). In line with 
Hendfridsson and Bygstad (2013), we developed a four-step approach for analyzing the collected data. 
First, we analyzed our data to identify events contributing to the development of residential Internet in 
Belarus. To do so, we created a textual summary of the chronology of important events for the Internet¶V 
development (Table C1 in Appendix C), by triangulating the data from interviews and secondary sources 
(Figure 1). This step was important for understanding the key technologies of the evolving Internet 
infrastructure (dial-up, HomeNet DIY infrastructures, asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL), and 
fiber-optic), the key actors and their interplays. Based on the chronology, we analyzed the breakthrough 
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events (Langley 1999) that introduced innovative technologies; we also identified four main phases in the 
infrastructure¶V evolution (Figure 1) and created detailed descriptions of residential Internet 
infrastructures for each phase. This step was helpful in understanding socioeconomic and political context 
shaping infrastructure development (Abbate 2000).  
Second, based on the first step , we created a list of key interactions shaping the development of 
residential Internet infrastructure at each phase. These are summarized in Table C2 in Appendix C. Our 
analysis identified 24 diverse interactions some of each continued across diverse phases (e.g. see 
interactions 4,5, and 8 in Table C2). Reflecting on this analysis, it was apparent that multiple interactions 
were played in parallel (e.g., between HomeNets and Beltelecom), where actors were impacted by but 
often ignoring/ unaware of each other¶V interactions and technologies. 
Third, to better understand actor interactions in this regard (e.g. how and why the actors created, 
accepted, or neglected infrastructural technologies and formed (or amended) different coalitions), we 
detailed the motivating logics of each actor. To do so, we built on interviews, secondary data and analysis 
of key events and technologies from the first step to identify the organizing principles, assumptions, and 
identities (Thornton and Ocasio 2008) of the key actors and how these framed DFWRUV¶ technologies, 
resources, and capabilities (Berente and Yoo 2012; Hultin and Mahring 2014). We summarize DFWRUV¶
logics in Table 2 and provide illustrative examples of these in the findings section. 
Our final step focused on creating a narrative description of the interplay between DFWRUV¶
interactions and logics and how it contributed to infrastructure development during each phase (see Table 
C3 in Appendix C). This analysis resulted in the elaboration of four types of actor interactions, which we 
detail in the findings. We concluded the analysis by revisiting and comparing the key contextual 
conditions and DFWRUV¶WHFKQRORJ\LQWHUSOD\based on the data analyzed in step one) for each identified 
interaction type which we summarize in Table 3. 
FINDINGS 
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Residential Internet infrastructure in Belarus emerged as a result of an unfolding interplay between multiple 
heterogenous actors (HomeNet communities, ISP firms, a state-owned ISP Beltelecom). These actors used 
multiple diverse technologies (e.g. dial-up, ADSL, DIY infrastructures, optic fibre, mesh-network intranets, 
game portals). AFWRUV¶orchestration and coordination were also dynamically changing, varying from non-
existent to strict government regulation, and from independent to highly interdependent actor contributions. 
The actors also relied on contesting logics. That is, Beltelecom operated on state logics, ISPs operated on 
market logics, HomeNets operated on community logics, and those HomeNets that transformed into ISPs 
after 2010 operated on hybrid logics. We summarize the distinctive organizing principles and assumptions, 
actor identities, technology framing, and resources and capabilities of each logic in Table 2. 
--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
,QFRUSRUDWLQJDFWRUV¶ logics into the analysis helped us to explain how DFWRUV¶DFWLons, technology 
framings, and interactions shaped and why actors ignored other actors, their motives, and technologies. 
What might have seemed irrational to one actor was rational and natural to others involved in interactions 
shaped by different goals and underlying logics of action. In this way, the nature and variety of actor 
interactions that we analyzed significantly exceeded the traditional direct actor interactions based on 
competition and collaboration and incorporated complex and non-linear DI development. 
Our findings illustrate that interactions of DI actors with heterogenous logics and multiple 
technologies were not only complex but also dynamically changing due to certain dynamically evolving 
processes at the ecology level (e.g. emergence of new technologies, introduction and changes of 
government regulations). To explore the processes and innovative outcomes of such complex and 
dynamically changing interactions of DI actors we focused on the following key dimensions characterizing 
DI development. First, we sought to understand the aFWRUV¶key interaction pattern characterizing how the 
interacting DI actors used RZQDQGRWKHUDFWRUV¶UHVRXUFHVHLWKHUEDVHGRQDFWRUV¶PXWXDOO\DGDSWLYHDQG
collaborative use of resources (i.e. symbiotic pattern) or based on exploitation and domination of other 
DFWRU¶VUHVRXUFHVLHSDUDVLWLFSDWWHUQ6HFRQGwe explored the type of ecological interplay that draw the 
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development of DI to understand how DFWRU¶VDFWLRQVDQGFRQWULEXWLRQVFRXOGEHLPSDFWHGnot only by direct 
interactions but also by contributions of the ignoring and non-interacting actors operating on contesting 
logics. In this paper, we distinguish between direct ecological interplays (labeled as mutualistic and 
mutually competitive) and indirect ecological interplays (labeled generative and complementary). Third, we 
explored how the development of DI infrastructure was shaped by the interplay of disjointed or shared and 
interdepended technologies. Finally, we explored how various regulations of actor behavior or their absence 
shaped the development of DI infrastructure.  
Our findings identify that combinations of the above shaping characteristics led to four different 
interaction types that shaped distinct paths of the residential Internet infrastructure development: 
symbiotic generative, symbiotic mutualistic, parasitic complementary, and parasitic competitive. Table 3 
summarizes key processes, shaping characteristics and innovation outcomes for each type of the identified 
interactions while following sections discuss these in details. 
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
Infrastructure Created by Symbiotic Generative Types of Interaction (1994±1999) 
Infrastructure developed via symbiotic generative interaction emerges as an alternative DI solution 
created by an emergent DI actor who is shaped by indirect ecological interplay and distinctive technology 
to adapt to the existing DI agency that is non-orchestrated, relies on contesting logics and disjointed 
technologies and fails to generate the innovative DI solution itself.  
In the Belarus case, a state-owned Beltelecom and private ISPs who failed to develop residential 
Internet infrastructure for various reasons. Private ISPs failed to recognize the importance of a residential 
Internet service following the rationale of market logics (see Table 2). As Table 2 illustrates, the ,63V¶
decision-making and firm capabilities were profit-driven and relied on market analysis. Respectively, 
technology development focused on the needs of dominant users and existing market demand. Given this 
market logic, the high costs of building residential infrastructure for residential clients at that time, who 
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had limited buying capacity, made this irrational. Instead, these ISPs focused on higher-value B2B 
markets, ignoring the needs of residential users. 
Likewise, the logics and related technology framing prevented the state-owned Beltelecom ISP 
from developing residential Internet infrastructure. Created in 1995 and fully owned and funded by the 
state, the company operated on a state logic (see Table 2) that implied vertical authority and a top-down 
planning of its goals and priorities: 
The government is planning on its behalf «QRWLQPRQH\LQGLFDWRUVEXWLQWKHQXPEHURI
services to provide: e.g. in 2016 Beltelecom needs to install X fixed phones and connect Y new 
Internet users. [Beltelecom engineer 3] 
You fulfil a plan ± \RXJHWSURPRWHG<RXGRQ¶WIXOILODSODQ± most probably, you get fired. 
[Beltelecom engineer 3] 
Following its logics and the LGHQWLW\RIDQDWLRQDOWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQRSHUDWRUWKDW³guarantees 
and develops technologies important for the government,´4 Beletelecom focused on prioritizing services 
to government organizations and enterprises. The company¶VILUVWUHVLGHQWLDOGLDO-up service appeared 
only in 1999 and was based on a problematic billing system (calculated as 1/30 of a $600 monthly cost of 
the allocated line, e.g., $20/hour, when an average monthly salary was $60). The innovation was met with 
resistance from top management, since the company aimed to fulfill the top-down performance indicators, 
which in this case was measured by ³the number of fixed telephone users and not Internet users´: 
We [engineers] would regularly come to the marketing department and try to persuade [the 
marketing director] to have flexible services for residents based on traffic consumption. And they 
ZRXOGDQVZHU³ZHGRQRWQHHGWKLV´ [Beltelecom leading engineer] 
Thus, despite access to exceptional resources and capabilities (e.g., government funds; monopoly on a 
highly developed residential telephone lines), Beltelecom chose to ignore the potential for the 
development of residential Internet infrastructure since the pursuit of the innovation was not rational in its 
logics. 7KHFRDFWLRQRI,63DQG%HOWHOHFRP¶VORJLFVDQGinteractions led to the situation where residential 
 
 
4 https://beltelecom.by/o-kompanii 
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XVHUV³were simply excluded from the Internet provider±user chain´ (ICTD-UNDP expert), which 
conditioned the emergence of a new DI actor, HomeNet communities. 
Ignorance from ISP and Beltelecom motivated residents to self-organize into an emergent DI 
actor, HomeNets. Based on the generativity of IT available to them, i.e., their home PCs, HomeNet 
members collectively developed new capabilities and addressed their unsatisfied needs to access services 
that are typically provided by an Internet infrastructure (e.g., file exchanges, multiparty games, chats). 
Unexpectedly, some universities, including leading IT universities in the Minsk capital, who were not 
involved directly in any specific interactions with other actors,  contributed to a broader understanding 
DPRQJUHVLGHQWVDERXW³what the Internet looked like´(HomeNet user) and what residents might use it for 
by providing cheap Internet access for thousands of their students living in dormitories (Minevich and 
Richter 2005). Thus, while the HomeNet idea of shared Internet access and services originated in IT 
student dormitories, it moved quickly to the residential sector, motivating intensive HomeNet creation 
from 1994 through 1996, developed primarily by young residents (16±18 years old): 
One day, my neighboring fellows called me and said³OLVWHQWKHUHLVDFRROWKLQJ± local 
networking ± DQG\RXFDQMRLQ´7KH\WROGPHWKDWZHFDQSOD\JDPHVWRJHWKHUVKDUHILOPVHWF
and that it is very cheap to join, just a cost of a piece of cable to my computer and switch. And I 
WKRXJKW³:K\QRW"´>+RPH1HWuser] 
The HomeNet in our building started spontaneously «$EXQFKRIXVZHUHKDQJLQJRXWFKDWWLQJ
and we got the idea about developing a ³PDNHVKLIW´Internet. Nobody knew what to do, we just 
came with the idea and made it work. [HomeNet administrator] 
HomeNets provided multiple services, such as chats, forums, and access to radio, media galleries, 
and local news updates, which offered a low-cost (members paid only the connection and maintenance 
fee) and immediately useful solution (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010) for residents. These HomeNets were 
driven by a community logic (see Table 2) that enabled the pooling of member resources, volunteering, 
reciprocity, and community decision-making: 
If equipment that connects a certain member breaks down, then this member, or a couple of his 
neighbors, pool some resources and change it. However, because it was often the case, we soon 
created a fund of shared resources to support the process. [HomeNet administrator] 
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Users helped on the volunteer basis because it was interesting for them to contribute« [HomeNet 
administrator] 
Our HomeNet included eight [multistory] buildings and «HLJKWSHRSOHZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRU
managing it. [HomeNet user] 
Being an offline and bricolage hand-made version of the Internet, HomeNet infrastructures were 
not joined with ISP solutions. Notably, HomeNets sought not to challenge the ISP ecology but to adapt to 
it with what was affordable and feasible within a separate but coexisting informal market: 
HomeNets then were filling the vacuum «EXLOWRQSXUHHQWKXVLDVPDQGQRPRQH\DWDOO«WKH\
were not in business; they were on a different side. [Beltelecom engineer] 
Nevertheless, HomeNet infrastructures rapidly grew in scale (Huang et al. 2019). Administrators and ISPs 
pointed to the rise before 2000 of several large networks with over 1,500 residential users each and 
dozens of smaller networks, which accounted for a large proportion of the total residential computer user 
population5 and stimulated further development of the residential Internet infrastructure. 
Infrastructure Created by Symbiotic Mutualistic Interaction (2000±2006) 
Infrastructure developed via symbiotic mutualistic interaction emerged as a result of a new regulation 
stimulating an unlikely actor partnership into a metaorganization where actors maintain their own 
authority and follow their own motivations, and logics, while developing mutually dependent capabilities 
and relying on shared and interdepend technologies (see Table 3). In the Belarus case, a new residential 
infrastructure for more than a million users developed around a symbiosis of ADSL technologies 
provided by ISPs and residential infrastructures provided by HomeNets.  
In 2001, a new law granted Beltelecom a monopoly right to resell Internet traffic to other ISPs. 
Deprived of the possibility to sell and exchange Internet traffic with each other, and seeking profit in line 
with their market logic, ISPs focused on serving high-end corporate clients instead of building their own 
residential infrastructures. To provide ADSL access to residents, ISPs had to rent telephone infrastructure 
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from Beltelecom, and set up the price too high for the residential ASDL market to develop. With an 
average salary in Belarus in 2000 of $82 (59,000 Blr), corporate ISPs offered ADSL access for $99 
(E115) per month and required a one-time connection fee of $700 for new clients.6 Moreover, lacking 
residential clients, ISP traffic was used at only 30 percent of its capacity during the day and not at all 
during night hours. 
In 2002, Beltelecom became one of the first adopters of the ADSL technology, primarily for its 
RZQFRPSDQ\¶VFOLHQWV in government. The company could easily have become the main provider of the 
residential Internet at that time, since ADSL relied on the infrastructure of landline telephone lines and 
automated telephone stations (ATS). Beltelecom was the monopoly owner of these, with a very high 
penetration level across Belarus (the highest of the former states of the USSR). However, following its 
state logic of fulfilling top-down performance indicators, measured by the number of connected telephone 
users (and not the number of Internet users), Beltelecom ignored the opportunity. The company also 
ignored HomeNets. As the company engineer stated: 
Indeed, we [employees] knew about HomeNets. Many used them at home but they existed in a 
³SDUDOOHO´UHDOLW\ «%HOWHOHFRP¶V official position was that HomeNets are not legal organizations. 
,W¶VQRWDJRRGWKLQJIRUDUHVSHFWHGVWDWHFRPSDQ\ «WRVXSSRUWDQ\XQRIILFLDOGHYHORSPHQWV6R
Beltelecom never had any dealings with HomeNets. 
The situation motivated ISPs to engage in an unlikely coadaptive alliance (O'Mahony and Bechky 
2008) with HomeNets. They formed a metaorganization (Gulati et al. 2012) where each actor maintained 
its own authority and followed its own motivations and logics while building on both its own and its 
SDUWQHUV¶PDWHULDOFRJQLWLYHQHWZRUNDQGOHJDOUHVRXUFHV 
The initiative to collaborate came from HomeNets that developed into large communities of 
several thousand members. In particular, HomeNet¶V scale, along with member experience of using 
ADSL at work or hearing about it from friends and relatives, led some administrators to realize that 
 
 
6
 http://www.e-belarus.org/news/200105301.html, https://42.tut.by/3975 
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community infrastructures could be used to help provide an inexpensive approach to ADSL-based access. 
Trying to link HomeNets into the existing ISP network (Sanner et al. 2014), they visited all ISPs and 
proposed ways to collaborate with them. Initially, it was only one ISP, Solo, that ³PDQDJHGWRVHHD
rationale in our idea.´(HomeNet administrator). Soon other ISPs realized that a HomeNet could bring as 
much profit as their targeted corporate clients and engaged in developing a collaborative infrastructure 
with HomeNets: 
In 2004±2005 all providers placed offers for HomeNets at their websites. By doing this, providers 
officially recognized their existence. [Sales manager of a large ISP] 
Each collaborating party was following its own distinctive goals (e.g., obtaining Internet access 
for entertainment and community resources through HomeNets, and maximizing their profit in the 
monopolistic conditions dictated to ISPs by Beltelecom) and acting within its own logics (i.e., market for 
ISPs and community for HomeNets). At the same time, they together achieved elements lacking in their 
own network by coadapting and codeveloping their technologies and operational processes. In essence, 
HomeNets provided the last-mile infrastructure to residential users that ISPs were lacking: 
Intensive night consumption of Internet by HomeNet users «ZDVDKXJHERQXVIRUSURYLGHUV «
HomeNets [thus] were offered big bonuses. [ISP manager] 
HomeNets were also maintaining this last-mile infrastructure, connecting new and supporting existing 
Internet end users who were members of their community. In line with market logics, ISPS now invested 
in HomeNets as their main clients, providing them with bonuses that stimulated their growth, such as a 
free modem and Internet bonuses for administrators: 
Our criteria for collaboration were at least five people in a HomeNet. This is all. The HomeNet 
would receive a free modem, free installation, they were our main customers then. Naturally, such 
offers motivated their development. [ISP Marketing manager] 
HomeNets and ISPs also coadapted their existing technologies and business processes. For 
example, ISPs developed new billing systems and supporting services to calculate and receive payments 
from HomeNet members (e.g., payments by Internet, infokiosks, at the post office, and by prepaid cards). 
They also hired experienced administrators as managers specializing in HomeNet communication, and 
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created technical support centers for HomeNets. In turn, the HomeNets restructured their infrastructure to 
incorporate many new members who wanted to join in order to gain Internet access and technically found 
ways to better support multiple Internet access from their shared modems. They also developed new roles 
for communicating with ISPs and selling prepaid cards to community members. 
Two platforms, one created by HomeNets (HomeNets.tut.by) and another created by ISPs 
(intranet services), facilitated access to each party¶V expertise and capabilities. Thus, the national 
HomeNet website, HomeNet.tut.by, emerged in 2002 and soon became the main platform for diverse 
HomeNets to communicate, develop their own mini-websites, and share their news, inquiries, and 
experiences, including those related to particular ISPs (see Figure 2). The website also contained a 
ranking of all ISPs by polling of HomeNet members. As stated by an ISP manager: 
All ISPs were active at the [Homenet.tut.by] website. They explained the company strategy, 
resolved emerging customer issues, provided feedback, promoted services, monitored each 
RWKHU¶VRIIHUV «'DLO\FRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWKXVHUVDWWKHZHEVLWHZDVDSDUWRIP\MRE 
Furthermore, following their market logics, ISPs invested in IT serving the needs of HomeNets as 
their dominant users and regularly updated it. As an ISP marketing director stated in interview, we made 
four updates to our infrastructures with HomeNets in three-year period. Thus, ISPs developed a variety 
of intranet services, such as media galleries, with films, music, and games. They also monitored 
PHPEHUV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGLPSOHPHQted innovative services (Authors 2016), and tested their own new 
VHUYLFHVYLDLQWUDQHWVE\³observing how members consumed these´(ISP manager). 
Nevertheless, as specified by Gulati et al. (2012), each party in the metaorganization maintained a 
degree of autonomy. For example, HomeNets introduced a number of additional ISPs to their infrastructure 
to prevent one from taking over the community: 
We thought it would be better if there will be several providers in the HomeNet so that they 
would compete with each other rather than dictate their conditions to us. The advantage of the 
first provider was that it had a file server, a second one was offering the cheapest Internet, yet 
another offered really speedy Internet. [HomeNet administrator] 
Thus, HomeNet members had a possibility, easily and for free, to switch on a day-to-day basis between 
different ISPs depending on their needs (e.g., connecting to an ISP with cheaper night Internet access or 
22 
 
 
to another ISP with more expensive but higher-speed Internet). This stimulated competition between ISPs 
for HomeNet users and led to a variety of new ISP services and special offers, such as FTP servers with 
films, and game servers (e.g., http://media.aplus.by, http://banana.by, now closed). 
HomeNet±ISP collaboration also changed the political dynamics (Sahay et al. 2009) by 
transforming HomeNets and their technologies from marginal and local into central: 
«SHRSOHstarted joining not because of HomeNet resources but because of the Internet «A 
profile of a HomeNet user became very diverse: there were tax inspectors, firemen, even KGB 
officers but also simple shop assistants, students, those who recently moved to Minsk «7KLV
idea started to be supported by many people. [HomeNet administrator] 
Soon, residential Internet access through ADSL±HomeNet infrastructure became the dominant form. Some 
experts estimated that about 90 percent of all home computers in Minsk during 2002±2009 became 
connected to the Internet via HomeNets (Scherban 2010). 
Infrastructure Created by Parasitic Complementary Interaction (2006±2009) 
Infrastructure developed by parasitic complementary interaction develops between the primary innovator 
who proposes a technologically advanced,  but ultimately unsuccessful in reaching end users 
infrastructural innovation, and another DI actor who develops a complementing parasitizing IT solution 
on the primary innovation. The parasitic complementary interaction allows the innovative infrastructure 
to scale beyond the tipping point but outside the control of the original innovator in a largely unregulated 
area and develop as an unprompted mesh network.  
In the Belarus case study, such parasitic complementary interaction led to the development of a an 
unprompted mesh network (Rodon and Silva 2015) linking a new branch of centralized residential 
Internet infrastructure created by Beltelecom to be complemented  by a parasitizing decentralized bottom-
up innovative solutions from HomeNets (see Table 3). As described below, these developments 
unexpectedly changed the political dynamics in the field in ways that led to an increase in the credibility 
and power of Beltelecom (Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Sahay et al. 2009). 
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The development of a new branch of residential Internet infrastructure by Beltelecom was 
motivated by two national programs, ³e-%HODUXV´±2010) and the Telecommunications 
Development Program (2006±2010), which announced its aim to increase the number of Internet users.7 
In line with these, Beltelecom¶V performance indicators changed to the number of Internet users, which 
led to a shift in the prioritized technologies. Residential ADSL technologies developed by a group of 
enthusiastic Beltelecom engineers, but neglected for years, suddenly received approval: 
For developing this [ByFly] service I received a monetary bonus to my salary and my boss 
received his desired promotion. [Beltelecom engineer] 
This is how, in %HOWHOHFRPLQWURGXFHG³%\FO\´± an unprecedented option for residents to 
receive unlimited Internet access. Being the monopolist in the provision of an Internet channel and ATS, 
Beltelcom was the only ISP that could offer truly unlimited ADSL Internet access. Driven by the state 
logics of fulfilling the goal of increasing the number of Internet users, the company introduced its first 
ever commercial advertising8 for its ByFly service and gave ISPs a hard time by increasing the rent for 
Internet channels by over 30 percent.9 
However, despite its technological superiority and unique offer, ByFly¶V infrastructure initially 
failed to enroll and attract users because of its high cost. ByFly¶V monthly fee was more than ten times a 
collaborative HomeNet ISP solution, and was therefore it was only purchased by the very high-end 
customers. Moreover, driveQE\VWDWHORJLFV%HOWHOHFRPZDVQRWVHQVLWLYHWRLWVFXVWRPHUV¶QHHGV, 
SURYLGLQJD³]HUR-OHYHO´FXVWRPHUVHUYLFH: 
%HOWHOHFRP¶V most important thing is to fulfil the plan, they not care a straw about people. 
[Director of a HomeNet ISP] 
7KLVJLDQW¶V%\IO\LVDQLQWHOOLJHQWDQGWHFKQLFDOO\-savvy solution. If they their CRM would be at 
the same level the majority of ISPs would soon become bankrupts. [ISP Director] 
 
 
7
 http://www.e-belarus.org/article/egov03.html; http://www.e-belarus.org/news/200610311.html 
8
 http://byfly.by/sites/default/files/video/22110.page_publ.byfly1.mpg 
9
 http://www.interminsk.com/news/7.html 
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Some HomeNet members found ways to transform this expensive and technically superior ByFly 
innovation into a low-cost solution available to far more users. Some residents started buying a ByFly 
service and then using existing HomeNet infrastructure to share their Internet access: 
We used the existing HomeNet [infrastructure]. Just instead of using the provider who operated in 
our network we shared my ByFly access through it. [HomeNet administrator] 
In other cases, households gained lower cost access to the Internet by jointly sharing the costs of 
ByFly. For example, some groups of neighbors, who did not previously use the Internet, created mini-
HomeNets for few as two to five people, the instructions for doing so widely available through 
Homenet.tut.by. This strategy was accelerated by the arrival of Wi-Fi: 
:LWKWKHHPHUJHQFHRI:L)LLWEHFDPHDUHDOO\PDVVSKHQRPHQRQ« Neighbors living at the 
same floor would usually form a network and «XVHWKH%HOWHOHFRP¶V%\IO\DQGVKDUH,QWHUQHW
costs. [It was] natural to do. [HomeNet administrator] 
In this way, ByFly innovation was complemented by innovative uses of HomeNet infrastructure, albeit 
with relatively inferior performance, given reliance on a multiplexed channel capacity that would often 
reduce signal quality.  
The emergent ByFly±HomeNet infrastructure was based on a mesh network where parasitizing 
solutions complemented insufficient capabilities of the original innovation in unprompted ways. The 
centralized ByFly service was enhanced by services that imitated services that were popular within 
HomeNet±ISP infrastructures, such as multiparty games, media download services, online radio services, 
forums, and chats, and included these free with the ByFly Internet service. The services were developed 
and included into Beltlecom¶V intranet by young IT specialists in Beltelecom. Being graduates from some 
of the best national IT universities, and active members of local game and open-source coding 
communities, they ZHUHGHYHORSLQJWKHVHVHUYLFHV³at their own risk´WRSXVK,7SURJUHVVLQWKHFRXQWU\ 
The game was to develop and launch cool services out of the top-management [bureaucratic] 
control and then, when they worked well, present them as good achievement for reaching the 
company goals. [gameplanet.by administrator] 
While the services were hosted by Beltelecom, administrators for these were chosen from local 
enthusiasts and hobbyists. 
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The development of the unprompted ByFly ± HomeNet mesh network allowed the ByFly 
infrastructure to scale and influence other major actors.  For example, in 2008, Beltelecom started hosting 
the biggest game server in the country, with a major impact on other ISPs providing similar services: 
The majority of the gamer community switched to the ByFly game project http://gameplanet.by. 
Their forum was one of the central and most numerous among ByFly users. This is why many 
game servers of other ISPs ceased to exist. [ISP sale manager] 
 
Official Beltelecom statistics indicated that the number of its ByFly users grew dramatically, 
from 3,000 in 2006 to 190,000 by 2007 and 520,000 or more by 2009.10 
However, following the state logics of ignoring HomeNets as unofficial actors, Beltelecom 
managers began to see HomeNets as competitors and an obstacle in fulfilling top-down indicators. The 
company started to literally cut down HomeNet cables. As a Beltelecom engineer explains: 
Using their ranks and some illegality of HomeNets, some Beltelecom managers sent workers to 
FXW+RPH1HWFDEOHVHJ³VLQFHZHDUHQRWDGYDQFLQJLQVHOOLQJ%\IO\EXWQHHGWRFRQQHFW000 
PRUHXVHUVE\WKHHQGRIWKH\HDUTXDUWHU´,WZDVQ¶WDQHOHJDQWVROXWLRQEXWLIZDVDSDUWRIWKHLU
reality: they get salary bonuses when fulfilling the plan and might be fired LIWKH\GRQ¶W. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Communication announced that HomeNet infrastructures were illegal.11 
By 2008, a program to eliminate HomeNets was approved by the government and a working group was 
created, which consisted of Beltelecom, Minsk television, the information networks organization, tax 
inspection, and the police. This generated hot debates on mass media outlets12 and HomeNet.tut.by. 
Following these top-down initiatives, local municipalities received an order to inspect and remove illegal 
residential HomeNets. This resulted in strong opposition by HomeNets. At the same time, many 
municipalities unofficially supported HomeNets since thousands of their workers and family members 
used HomeNet services as the most affordable means. As a result, they RIWHQSUHWHQGHG³QRWWRQRWLFHDQ\
 
 
10 http://web.archive.org/web/20130118011141/http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/publications/yearbook/2012/yearbook_2012.rar 
11
 http://www.e-belarus.org/news/200610311.html 
12 https://42.tut.by/178813, http://providers.by/2009/05/news/chinovnik-nazval-ceny-legalizacii-domashnej-seti/ 
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FDEOHV´DQGZDUQHG+RPH1HWVEHIRUHKDQGLQDFDVHRIYHULILFDWLRQZRUNVIURPWKHFLW\FRXQFLOLQVRPH
FDVHVHYHQPLVOHDGLQJWKHODWWHUVXFKDVE\JXLGLQJWKHFRPPLVVLRQWR³VDIH´locations.  
One consequence of the above interactions was that Beltelecom was gradually developing a 
leading position in ADSL access. By 2008, ByFly held 35 percent of the market in the capital, Minsk, and 
about 70 percent in other cities, where ISPs did not have a developed ADSL infrastructure.13 
Infrastructure Created by Parasitic Competitive Interaction (2008±2015) 
Infrastructure developed by parasitic competitive interaction emerges when heterogeneous actors 
compete with one another with a new technology, for which they develop idiosyncratic technology frames 
and disjointed innovative solutions. Intensive actor rHJXODWLRQVLQWKHILHOGIXUWKHUVWLPXODWHDFWRUV¶direct 
interactions based on exploitation and domination. This leads to the dissolution of some organizational 
actors as well as the emergence of new actors. The resulting infrastructure consolidates around providing 
similar technological solutions by the competing multiple heterogenous actors. As explained in the rest of 
the section, the competitive parasitic interactions unfolded around the introduction of fiber-optic 
technology and strict government regulations, leading to the dissolution of HomeNets, the emergence of 
HomeNet ISPs, and infrastructure consolidation around three main technologies (fiber optics (leading the 
market), ADSL, and wireless solutions) provided simultaneously by the competing Beltelecom, ISPs and 
HomeNet ISPs (see Table 3). 
In 2008, ISPs became interested in developing their own infrastructure based on new fiber-optic 
technologies, instead of using the monopolistically owned Beltelecom landline infrastructures to provide 
the ADSL services. Originally, HomeNets were considered important partners in the project, providing 
the last-mile connection and enabling ISPs to decrease costs of building fiber infrastructure. Revenues 
from new fiber Internet were planned to come from Ethernet services, such as IPTV, games, and media 
 
 
13
 http://www.e-belarus.org/news/200810021.html 
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services, that ISPs had been developing in collaboration with HomeNets. However, the interplay of ISPs 
and Beltelecom changed all actor interactions in the field to parasitic and led to HomeNet dissolution. 
Thus, driven by the state logic to gain national leadership14 and impressive performance measured 
by the number of Internet users, Beltelecom competed with ISPs on the bureaucratic and technical 
capacity sides: 
as soon as ISPs «QHJRWLDWHGZLWK%HOWHOHFRPWKDWit ZRQ¶WGDPSWKHSULFHVDQ\PRUHLW
increased the width of its [Internet] channel. For the same money a Beltelecom user now gets 
twice the speed. [ISP director] 
Beltelecom used the support from the government actors as redistribution mechanism (Thornton 
et al. 2012) to exclude ISPs from resources necessary to developing fiber infrastructure. Thus, in 2007 the 
government introduced a new innovation fund, created by a new tax that required all ISPs to pay 1.5 
percent of their monthly profit. The fund announced access for all ISPs on the basis of a bidding scheme. 
+RZHYHU³de facto this is only Beltelecom who gets money from it´(UNDP consultant). To oppose this, 
in May 2010, nine major private ISPs signed an open letter to Parliament, the National Ministry of 
Connection, and the National Ministry of Economy, calling for the demonopolization of the industry. The 
government answered with the introduction of a new state ISP, the National Traffic Exchange Center, in 
September 2011, with the avowed purpose of demonopolizing the industry.15 
Following the market logic and seeking to compete with and bypass Beltelecom on the market, 
ISPs invested heavily in the development of fiber-optic Ethernet infrastructure submitting innovative 
project applications to win permission IURPWKH&LW\¶VH[HFXWLYHFRPPLWWHH, Ispolkom. However, 
unexpectedly, the Beltelecom subsidiary, Minsk Telephone Lines, joined the Ethernet market and 
challenged Ispolkom¶Vrights to grant permission on its territory in Minsk. This led Ispolkom to block all 
Ethernet applications (except from Beltelecom) from 2007 till 2009. The Association of Belarussian ISPs 
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 http://forum.onliner.by/viewtopic.php?t=413579; http://www.interminsk.com/archive/beltelecom 
15
 http://www.e-belarus.org/news/201212141.html 
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(formed in 2001) intensively negotiated and successfully resolved this issue only at the end of 2009,16 
when Beltelecom was already in the process of preparing its fiber-optic infrastructure in line with a new 
national program, ³(OHFWURQLF%HODUXV´±2015), where its leading role had been specified. 
Seeking to generate profit and find resources to develop fiber infrastructure in such conditions, 
ISPs started looking for ways to appropriate HomeNet infrastructures and users. A great opportunity came 
from a new government Internet law, N60. Issued in February 2010 in preparation for the December 2010 
presidential elections, the law introduced the obligatory identification of all Internet users, thereby 
effectively inhibiting shared HomeNet Internet access: 
6XGGHQO\+RPH1HWV³WXUQHG´LQWRDSODFHZKHUHSRWHQWLDOO\GDQJHURXVFRQWHQWFRXOGEH
spread «2IILFLDOO\+RPH1HWVEHFDPHLOOHJDORUJDQL]DWLRQV. [ISP manager] 
[After the law] HomeNets continued to exist but «QRWLQRSHQZD\>+RPH1HWXVHU@ 
Before the law, HomeNets were widely discussed everywhere ± in Internet, press, on ISP 
websites; after the law, they ³GLVDSSHDUHG´EHFDPH³JUH\´QHWZRUNV. [HomeNet administrator] 
Following the law, ISPs redefined their long-standing collaborative relationships with HomeNets 
to one that was parasitic. Thus, big ISPs started actively proposing to ³KHOS´legalize HomeNets by offering 
incorporation of the community infrastructure and making an individual client agreement with every 
member, while also allowing clients the right to use their HomeNet infrastructure free of charge.17 
Following the market logic, ISPs offered monetary bonuses to HomeNets, such as by hiring their 
administrators as managers, offering individual ³OLIHORQJ´reductions in Internet price, or purchasing the 
HomeNet infrastructure for a negotiated sum. In some cases, the strategy worked: 
,QLWLDOO\>ZHSDLG@GROODUVIRUHDFKXVHU«/DWHUZHXQGHUVWRRGKRZPXFKLWKDG cost to attract 
the same member with our own means and the price became lower. [Sales director of a big ISP] 
Out of all ISPs, Solo [ISP] had the most liberal conditions. As everyone else, they were fully 
incorporating the HomeNet infrastructure but proposed to hire administrators. But they became 
the legal owners after this. [HomeNet administrator] 
 
 
16
 http://providers.by/2009/05/news/razreshenie-na-sozdanie-seti-poluchit-nevozmozhno 
17 http://providers.by/by-providers/lans/; http://providers.by/2009/05/news/chinovnik-nazval-ceny-legalizacii-domashnej-seti 
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In other cases, this generated conflicts with the community logics of HomeNet members: 
 No way! We built it with our own hands! [HomeNet user] 
Many ISPs developed special strategies for incorporating HomeNets: 
We tried to conquer their minds in order to incorporate. We knew their difficulties well: members 
leaving because of legal restrictions, breaking HomeNet infrastructures, lack of time and 
assistants. [ISP manager] 
We put notes that we were going to build a high-speed Internet highway in the distinct with 
invitations for every potential user to call. In reality, we were not going to build anything « but it 
disoriented administrators who thought of investing into developing their HomeNets into ISPs 
and we got contacts of those who might potentially leave. [ISP operational director] 
As a result of such parasitic interactions, the majority of HomeNets were either incorporated into 
ISPs or dissolved. Some +RPH1HWVZKHUH³administrators were smart and strong enough to reject the 
arguments about the pessimistic future of their networks´(ISP operational manager) survived and 
developed into competitors (Sahay et al. 2009) by transforming into a new organizational species, called 
HomeNet ISPs (e.g., Unet,18 Flynet,19 Onenet20). These new actors relied on a hybrid logic (see Table 2), 
being community-driven market players generating profit. Developing Internet infrastructures to serve 
UHVLGHQWV¶QHHGVWKH\FRPSHWHGZLWKRWKHU,63VZKLOHGHOLYHULQJPDQ\VHUYLFHVWRHDFKRWKHU:  
We provide the billing systems to other HomeNet ISPs «RQDIULHQG-to-IULHQGEDVLV«  We do 
not compete with each other «7KH\DUHDOOIULHQGVZKRDUHLQWKHVDPHFRQGLWLRQV. [Director of 
HomeNet ISP] 
HomeNet ISPs focused on developing fiber-optic infrastructures to provide high-quality Internet and on 
original intranet services to build on their well-established relationships with users/community members. 
This enabled these HomeNet ISPs to occupy the six top positions in the national ranking of ISPs based on 
customer reviews in 2017 (leaving Beltelecom 38th out of 47 providers; http://providers.by/rating).  
To take the lead in the number of Internet users, Beltelecom changed telephone landlines in all 
residential properties from copper lines to fiber-optic ones, connecting its two millionth Internet user in 
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 https://unet.by/about 
19
 https://flynet.by/about 
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2015 and eliminating the technical possibility for other ISPs to provide ADSL there. Beltelecom thus 
focused on gigabit passive optical network (GPON) fiber-optic, enabling the individual connection of 
every household, complemented with standard digital TV and landline phone solutions, and provided 
ADSL and wireless connections as alternatives, in cases where its GPON was not available. Monthly 
prices (December 2017) of unlimited GPON-based Internet access were as low as $3.5 (7 Blr)-$7.5 (15.5 
Blr)21, including unlimited Internet, interactive HD TV, fixed telephone line being  (with average monthly 
salary being $400). Many ISPs acknowledged in interviews in 2016 that customer service was the only 
area where they could beat Beltelecom: 
We are lucky that they [Beltelecom] do not know how to sell. [ISP marketing director] 
Beltelecom is our main competitor. The company is shameless in dumping prices and impose its 
services to everyone. Taking into account that it is also the monopolist on selling Internet 
highlines ± LW¶VH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWWRFRPSHWHZLWK>,63 director] 
In contrast with Beltelecom, ISPs focused on fiber to the building (FTTB) solutions and copper 
lines to individual households, being less expensive to repair and providing more equity in speeds and 
input/output data flows (which are important for intranet services). However, in the face of high 
competition (with Beltelecom but also, following the market logic, between themselves), the two biggest 
ISPs disappeared. In 2015, Solo (the oldest corporate ISP and a pioneer in HomeNet±ISP collaboration) 
was purchased by Atlant. In December 2016, Atlant was purchased by a cell phone operator, Velcom. 
In this way, as summarized in Table 3, the innovative Internet residential infrastructure developed 
via similar DI solutions (e.g. different combinations of the fiber optic, ADSL, and wireless technologies 
provided by multiple heterogenous actors with contesting logics. 
 
DISCUSSION 
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Our study examined how DI infrastructure develops in ecologies with multiple heterogeneous actors 
operating on contesting logics, diverse technologies and various orchestration levels. Our findings 
illustrate that DI development follows complex non-linear paths and four types of symbiotic and parasitic 
actor interactions through which the DI shaped and evolved. Based on these, we develop a model of 
symbiotic and parasitic interactions shaping DI development and discusses the theoretical and practical 
implications of our findings. 
A Model of Symbiotic and Parasitic Interactions Shaping Digital Infrastructure Development 
Generalizing our insights, we develop a model of symbiotic and parasitic interactions of DI agency 
shaping digital infrastructure development. Our model theorizes that the four identified types of symbiotic 
and parasitic interactions develop in the ecologies with the following characteristics: a) multiple 
heterogenous actors with contesting logics; b) multiple technologies with different degrees of confluence; 
c) various types of ecological interplays; d) diverse and changing levels of actor orchestration (see Figure 
4).  
--- Insert Figure 4 here --- 
The model illustrates that the combination of factors, such as technology confluence, type of 
ecology interplay, and orchestration, shapes the DI path. Technology confluence describes 
interdependencies between diverse technologies used by multiple heterogenous DI actors. We distinguish 
between low levels of technology confluence, whereby the innovating actors rely on separate diverse or 
similar technological solutions, and high levels of technology confluence, when the innovating actors 
build on shared or partly shared technologies. The integration of diverse levels of technology confluence 
is important for capturing diverse ways in which digital infrastructure can develop. As discussed above, 
the specificity of latter that distinguishes it from other infrastructures, such as roads, is that it allows 
expansion not only via tightly but also via loosely organized (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Tiwana et 
al. 2010) integration of new innovative solutions. In this way, residential Internet infrastructure in Belarus 
was able to grew on an alternative innovative solution developed by HomeNets from affordable DIY 
32 
 
 
technologies which were relatively independent and disjointed from infrastructural technologies of other 
actors (ISPs and Beltelecom) but served a similar need.  
Type of ecological interplay characterizes how the diverse interaction strategies adapted by the 
heterogenous actors interplay at the ecology level. This characteristic suggests that, as actors adapt, 
exploit, dominate or ignore other actors they can interplay via direct interactions, i.e. based on reciprocal 
interplay and awareness, as well as indirect interactions, i.e. taking place via ecological impacts and/or 
without reciprocal awareness of the involved actors. Incorporating both direct actor interactiosn and 
indirect ecological impacts into the analysis provides valuable insights for following the nonlinearity of 
digital infrastructure development and understanding how indirect ecological impacts might shape the 
development of the infrastructure paths. 
Finally, orchestration refers to the coordination and regulation of actor behavior in the ecology, 
such as state laws regulating particular actor interactions and cultivating or otherwise deliberately 
influencing the behavior of other actor. Based on these factors, we distinguish between high and low 
levels of orchestration, i.e., intensively and nonintensively coordinated and regulated behavior of DI 
actors.  
The model suggests that  the combinations of above ecology-level factors conditions the four 
diverse modes of symbiotic and parasitic actor interactions, which lead to different paths in DI 
development. As Figure 4 illustrates, symbiotic generative type of interaction of the distributed DI agency 
develops when the behavior of heterogeneous actors in the ecology is not orchestrated, is motivated by 
non-direct ecological interplay and relies on separate technologies with low technology confluence. In 
such case, actorV¶ logics and interactions are structured around separate diverse technologies whereby 
each actor satisfies the specific needs of a narrow set of users. DI in this case emerged as an isolated 
alternative solution created by a new actor (i.e. HomeNet communities), who developed an unprompted 
innovation (HomeNet infrastructures) to adapt to the existing ecology of actors.  
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Symbiotic mutualistic interaction develops in ecologies where actor interactions are orchestrated 
(i.e., new state regulation enables private ISPs to sell Internet to individual and business clients but not to 
other ISPs) and where previously unconnected actors become intensively engaged via a new technology 
that enables confluence between their existing distinct technologies. DI solution in this case emerged 
based on shared technologies that were collectively developed in a metaorganization by HomeNet and 
ISPsGHVSLWHWKHDFWRUV¶GLYHUVHtechnologies, logics and motives (see Figure 4).  
Parasitic complementary interaction develops when actor interactions around new technology are 
not orchestrated but where the technology enables confluences and direct interplay between previously 
unconnected actors. This stimulates some actors to engage in opportunistic behavior and develop 
unprompted mesh networks by parasitizing on novel technological solutions developed by other actors. 
As a result, interactions unfold around a novel DI developed by one actor (HomeNets) based on partly/ 
unintentionally shared IT innovation owned and developed by another actor (Beltelecom) (see Figure 4). 
Parasitic competitive interaction develops in ecologies with high degrees of actor orchestration, 
intensive actor interplays and low degrees of technology confluences. The logics and interactions of 
heterogeneous actors organize around FRPSHWLQJDQGSDUDVLWL]LQJRQHDFKRWKHUV¶UHVRXUFHVDQG
capabilities while developing separate similar DI solutions (i.e. fiber optic services).  
Notably, we found that symbiotic interactions developed in ecologies where the orchestration of 
DFWRUV¶interactions and technology confluences were aligned (i.e., being both either of high or low 
degrees) (see Figure 4), since this led to fewer conflicts and more mutually adapting actor interactions. In 
contrast, parasitic interactions developed in ecologies with diverse GHJUHHVRIRUFKHVWUDWLRQRIDFWRUV¶
interactions and technology confluences (i.e. low and high combinations). This effect might arise because 
new technologies with high degrees of confluence between previously unconnected actors combined with 
low degrees of actor orchestration might stimulate some actors to engage in opportunistic behavior (e.g., 
illegal shared Wi-Fi connections based on HomeNet infrastructures). In a similar vein, high degrees of 
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actor orchestration combined with low degrees of technology confluence stimulate actor parasitizing 
mutually competitive behavior.  
Furthermore, our findings suggest that changes within the types and trajectories of actor 
interactions that lead to novel DI development are triggered by new technologies and regulations, and 
their combinations. Thus, new regulations change the ongoing paths of DI development because they 
influence strategic actor choices with whom to interact, amend the interaction rules and intentions, and 
challenge existing interactions and power balances. For example, government laws changed the paths of 
residential Internet infrastructure development by obliging ISPs to buy Internet channel from Beltelecom 
and motivating them to consider an otherwise unlikely alliances with HomeNets, stimulating 
%HOWHOHFRP¶VKLJKO\LQWHUDFWLRQV with other actors by introducing the priority on the number of its Internet 
(instead of telephone) users, and disturbing the long-lasting HomeNet-ISP alliances. Without such 
regulations, the unfolding dynamics of residential Internet infrastructure development could be very 
different, leading to a different enactment of opportunities emerging from new technology and different 
interaction dynamics and infrastructural paths. For example, introduction of a new ADSL technology in 
the absence of the monopoly law on Beltelecom exclusive right for re-selling the Internet channel would 
make ISPs the major actors ignoring the value of HomeNet infrastructures and developing more 
centralized infrastructures with fewer variety of customer services. Likewise, the absence of 2008 and 
2010 government Internet regulation laws would allow the residential infrastructure to develop mainly 
through the HomeNet ± ISP metaorganization leading to greater diversity of Ethernet services and peer 
networks, instead of infrastructure consolidation around similar DI solutions. At the same time, 
regulations are important but not exclusive triggers of DI development and change. 
New technology extends possibilities and ways in which each actor in the ecology can react to 
regulations or their absence and provides new opportunities and platforms for actor interactions that 
previously were inexistent, unlikely, or hard to achieve. In particular, new technologies provide tools via 
which actors with contesting logics can instantiate their logics in new ways that might enable previously 
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non-existent interactions. In this regard, considering the interplay of multiple technologies (e.g. 
technology confluence) is particularly fruitful for understanding how potentially unlikely or non-linear 
actor interactions develop through a variety of disjointed (e.g. initial HomeNet DIY infrastructures), 
interdependent or partly shared technology solutions. For example, introduction of ADSL technology 
enabled the previously inexistent confluence between diverse HomeNet and ISP technologies and their 
otherwise unlikely collaboration via metaorganization. Likewise, combination of new unlimited (ByFly) 
Internet service and WiFi technology with existing HomeNet infrastructures led to the development of a 
partly shared innovative mesh network enabling an otherwise unlikely interplay of HomeNets and 
Beltelecom.  
The principal novelty of our model is that it incorporates the interplay of multiple actor 
technologies, a variety of ecological interplay (including both direct interactions and indirect impacts) and 
variety of actor orchestration degrees. In this regard, the model differs significantly from existing 
ecological frameworks that prioritize deliberate and orchestrated  (e.g., Dougherty and Dunne 2015) 
which focuses on orchestrating deliberate actions of multiple participants. As we illustrate in the paper, 
emergent and non-orchestrated interactions were particularly important for the development of HomeNet 
infrastructures in symbiotic generative interactions and residential Wi-Fi infrastructures building on 
ByFly solutions in parasitic complementary interactions. In this regard, the model provides value for 
understanding a variety and non-linearity of DI development paths beyond those highlighted by 
traditional cooperation and competition interactions. The model is also illustrative of a profoundly 
collective nature of processes and outcomes of DI development, suggesting that even in ecologies where 
potenWLDOVIRUFRQIOXHQFHVRIDFWRUV¶GLYHUVHWHFKQRORJLHVDUHORZDQGDFWRUVDUHQRWRUFKHVWUDWHG, DI can 
be co-shaped by logics and interactions of multiple actors via non-direct ecological impacts (e.g. DI 
emerging via symbiotic generative interactions). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of 
our model below. 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
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Our findings make several theoretical contributions. First, our findings on symbiotic and parasitic 
interactions complement emerging research on new forms of multiactor networks and the processes of 
collective shaping of DI by the distributed innovation agency (e.g., Boland et al. 2007; Garud et al. 2008; 
Lyytinen et al. 2016; Nambisan et al. 2017). Specifically, our findings contribute to and extend existing 
knowledge on diverse forms of interactions within the distributed DI agency (Boland et al. 2007; 
/\\WLQHQHWDO2¶0DKRQ\DQG%HFN\7XHUWVFKHUHWDO. The identified symbiotic and 
parasitic interactions, their processes, shaping characteristics and innovative outcomes (detailed in Table 
3 and discusses in the proposed model in Figure 4) might be generalizable to the development of other DI 
in settings that assume interactions of multiple actors with diverse institutional logics and multiple 
technologies. In particular, we suggest that research on blockchain, Internet of things, digital platforms, 
smart cities, 3D printing, and car manufacturing (that builds on open software solutions and spans 
industrial boundaries) can benefit from the proposed model in developing insights on the variety and non-
linearity of interaction shaping DI developments, as well as their processes, conditions and outcomes.  
Second, our study is among the first to examine the interplay of multiple technologies in the DI 
development. Previous studies have discussed that collectives of distributed actors succeed in DI 
development either under an umbrella of a common project, services or sociotechnical system (e.g., 
Boland et al. 2007; Tuertscher et al. 2013; Oborn et al. 2019) or by excluding multiple versions of digital 
infrastructures (e.g., Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Aanestad and Jensen 2011; Sahay et al. 2009). A 
common argument in these diverse studies is that a specific technology serves as a coordination tool for 
matching contributions from highly diverse multiple actors. Our findings importantly extend these 
insights by highlighting how DI develops via combinations of multiple technologies that might interplay 
in diverse and unpredictable manner and with various degrees of confluence,  including separate and 
independent (as in symbiotic generative interactions), shared (as in symbiotic mutualistic interactions), 
partly shared (as in parasitic complementary interactions), or similar coexisting solutions (as in parasitic 
competitive introductions). The interplay of multiple diverse technologies contributes to DI development 
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not by serving a coordination and orchestration tool (e.g. Nambisan et al. 2017) but by enabling various 
and often unlikely combinations of diverse technologies to act as a gateways integrating innovative 
developments from heterogenous actors into a DI that would be unlikely to emerge around single 
technology.   
Third, our findings support recent arguments by Oborn et al. (2019) about limitations of 
orchestration strategies for DI development and illustrate the importance of incorporating both 
orchestrated and nonorchestrated actor interactions and, specifically, the role of indirect and nonreciprocal 
actor interactions, in the analysis. In this regard, our findings support and extend existing studies about 
nonlinear ways of DI development (Gulati et al. 2012; Lyytinen et al. 2016; Nambisan et al. 2017) by 
detailing how actor interplays might be mutually shaping without direct interactions and contribute to 
complex and emergent DI development beyond the original intentions, resources, and capabilities of a 
solo innovator (Garud et al. 2008).  
Forth, our study is among the first to incorporate the interplay of contesting logics of multiple 
heterogenous actors into the analysis of DI development and suggests its value and novel insights in this 
regard.. Thus, the concept of institutional logics is helpful in capturing diverse ways in which 
heterogenous actors think about their rules and resources in the field (e.g., see Table 2). and explaining 
how and why actors intentionally or intentionally neglected and downplayed innovative opportunities 
offered by new and emerging technologies because of the different organizing principles, assumptions 
and technology framing in their meaning systems (Barrett et al. 2013; Garud et al. 2013), such as in the 
case of Beltelecom, which neglected the development of residential Internet infrastructure despite having 
resources to do so.  At the same time, while previous studies have discussed that actor logics enable and 
constrain actors in building on certain rules and resources (Berente and Yoo 2012; Carlile 2002; Garud et 
al. 2013; Hultin and Mähring 2014), our findings challenge this assumption. In particular, our findings 
suggest that the interplay of multiple diverse technologies might provide DI actors with insights into rules 
and access to resources that are not typical of the repertoires afforded by their dominant logics.  Thus, 
38 
 
 
while previous studies have argued that actor logics instantiate in the technology (Gawer and Phillips 
2013ZHDUJXHWKDWWKHLQWHUSOD\RIDFWRUV¶PXOWiple logics, diverse technologies and various ecological 
impacts condition synergies into the collective DI development processes and outcomes that exceed the 
sum of resources, rules and capabilities of  individually contributing actors. The cases of symbiotic 
mutualistic and parasitic complementary interactions are illustrative in this regard. 
Fifths, the four identified symbiotic and parasitic types of interactions nuance our knowledge on a 
possible repertoire of nonlinear paths of DI development (Garud et al. 2013; Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010) 
and extend our knowledge on asynchronies associated with non-linear and non-orchestrated DI 
development. Studies have pointed to diverse nonlinearities that characterize the processes of DI 
development across time (Ansari and Garud 2009; Garud et al. 2013) and space (e.g., Oborn et al. 2019). 
Our study builds on and extends these findings by highlighting the variety of nonlinearities and 
complexities that act as ³JHQHUDWLYHIRUFHVWKDWDUHUHTXLUHGWRVXVWDLQLQQRYDWLRQV´*DUXGHWDOS
801), including asynchronies/ignorance in actors logics, disjointed technologies and the emergent 
interplay of direct and indirect ecological impacts. These nonlinearities and complexities were crucial for 
enabling the residential Internet infrastructure in Belarus to develop as open innovation systems 
incorporating a variety of unprompted actors and unanticipated processes and consequences (Lyytinen et 
al. 2016; Zittrain 2008).  
Finally, our findings suggest a need for researchers to rethink the role of regulations, power and 
control in actor ecologies shaping DI development. Our findings on the important role of regulations 
support studies that have argued for incorporating political and institutional regulations into the analysis  
of the development of digital infrastructures  (Aanestad and Jensen 2011; Constantinides and Barrett 
2014b; Sahay et al. 2009). Furthermore, our findings support and extend some recent studies arguing that 
control becomes decentralized in multiactor DI networks (e.g., Lyytinen et al. 2016). Actors that 
historically were not in power in the particular context (such as ISPs and HomeNet communities) and 
were dominated by traditionally powerful actors with distinct logics (such as Beltelecom and the state) 
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used the capacities of IT to generate a distinctive source of power based on an ability to achieve 
technology confluence. Our findings thus suggest that in the ecologies of heterogenous actors with 
diverse logics and technologies the sources of power shift from pure regulative and legitimate capacities 
to the ability to generate idiosyncratic solutions enabling one to symbiotically adapt, parasitize, or 
otherwise complement and build on distinct technologies and infrastructures created by other actors. 
Our study offers several practical implications. First, our findings illustrate a need for DI 
regulators and curators to consider that privileging or excluding certain actors can lead to shifts and 
unexpected reconfigurations of the whole infrastructure, beyond the intended and focused regulations 
imposed on a limited number of actors. Second, our findings suggest that those under regulations might 
be mindful of cooperative opportunities with unexpected and unprompted partners as these might provide 
successful opportunities to develop IT capabilities in novel ways. Third, our findings motivates 
innovators  to explore and leverage opportunities of linking diverse technologies from previously 
unconnected actors. While this will require certain openness to otheUDFWRUV¶GLVWLQFWORJLFVDQGIRUPVRI
organizing, our findings suggest that such alliances might take place without a need to scarify or 
VLJQLILFDQWO\PRGLI\DFWRUV¶RZQORJLFV and enable access to resources beyond those available within their 
boundaries and logics. Finally, our findings suggest that actors with fewer resources and less power (such 
as HomeNet communities) can develop into key contributors to and central innovators in DI development 
when they are sensitive to emergent IT capabilities and networking with actors with distinct forms of 
organizing and contesting logics. 
Future Research 
Our findings provide several avenues for further research on DI development constituted by distributed 
agency. First, they illustrate a need for further research to go beyond the focus on direct actor interactions 
and consider a broader variety of actor interplays, including indirect ecological impacts. Second, taking 
into account the significant role of technology in shaping diverse actor interactions, it would be 
interesting to explore technology as an active coshaping non-human actant (e.g. Callon 1986). Our 
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findings highlight a need for further research to incorporate a broader view on the role of technology and 
the aspects of confluences of multiple technologies in the ecologies comprised of multiple heterogenous 
actors. In particular, future research on multiactor interactions needs to better understand the role and 
interplay of technologies which are not only commonly shared by also partly shared and 
separate/disjointed. Finally, as digital technology redistributes control and provides continuous 
opportunities for actors to use and modify it in novel ways (Lyytinen et al. 2016; Nambisan et al. 2017; 
Oborn et al. 2019; Yoo  2013), further insights are needed to understand the dynamics of ecologies where 
DI actors might engage in a variety of prehensible and opportunistic relationships with unlikely partners 
(Haraway 2003). It would be particularly interesting to investigate whether and how the identified 
symbiotic and parasitic interactions hold true across a diverse scope of actors, technologies and a broader 
set of institutional logics. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations of this study. First, the logics of the actors involved in DI development were 
mostly pure (as Table 2 indicates, only HomeNet ISPs relied on hybrid logics). Research studying actors 
operating with a greater variety of hybrid logics might reveal different actor interactions and their 
combinations not captured in this study. Second, we limited our analysis to actors involved in the 
development of landline residential Internet infrastructure and excluded mobile ISPs (which have been 
quite active in Belarus since 2012). Research comprising even greater variety and multiplicity of 
technologies might find different patterns of technology confluences and underlying actor interactions. 
Third, the regulative aspects in our case study were quite radical (e.g. either absent or strict). Research on 
industries with milder regulatory modes might discover other types or variations of interactions. Finally, 
residential Internet technologies in our study were of a relatively low cost, This enabled multiple and 
heterogenous actors to join the interplay, instantiate technology differently and increased the scope of 
available DI solutions. Research on technologies with higher costs could find a limited repertoire of 
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participating actors and generated DI solutions which could generate limited types of technology 
confluence. These limitations provide opportunities for further studies to refine and extend our findings. 
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Major Events in the Belarusian Residential Internet Industry 
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Belarus obtains its independence 
Eight ISPs operate on the market but focus 
mainly on corporate clients 
 
First HomeNets emerge 
HomeNets develop an informal market with 
innovative services substituting the lacking 
online access 
Beltelecom launches residential dial-up 
access 
All ISPs invest in ADSL technology. 
Corporate ISPs get the government 
permission to rent the national telephone 
HomeNets and corporate ISPs launch 
collaboration and develop ADSL market 
National HomeNet website appears 
All corporate ISPs develop tight 
collaboration with HomeNets 
Beltelecom launches ByFly (unlimited 
Internet ʹaccess ) service 
HomeNets parasitize on the technology 
using their infrastructure capabilities. 
Number of ByFly users quickly grows  
Fiber-based Internet services are launched 
by ISPs 
Government laws regulating Internet 
restrain HomeNet existence 
Emergence of HomeNet ISPs 
Tough competition between corporate ISPs 
and Beltelecom 
Beltelecom reduces prices for its services 
Bankruptcy of major corporate ISPs 
Beltelecom dominates the residential 
market with Ethernet services 
HomeNet ISPs lead the national ranking as 
the best ISP providers 
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Figure 3. Residential Wired Networking in Minsk 
 
Table 1. Interviews 
Respondents Details 
 July 2010±April 2012 Nov-Dec 2016 
HomeNets Administrators 37 Users 22 Administrators 5 Users  
7Net 
AllOff,by 
B&B 
Damavik 
Digital Home 
NRM 
Dom 7 
Gaya.net 
GURT 
Home 
Home-net 
InterLAN 
JamCrew 
J-NET 
KIEVSKAYA 
Legion 2 
Lorien 
LSD 
MassNet 
Neshta 
Never,net 
N-Net 
Noname net 
NRC 
Open.net 
Ruslanaga 
S.K.Y 
Serebrianka 
Skynet 
ST 
STONENET 
StreamLine 
ThunderNet 
Unified Network Home 
Vostochka.net 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Table 2. Heterogeneous AFWRUV¶Logics 
Key actors 
and logics 
Organizing principles and 
assumptions 
Identity Technology framing Resources and capabilities 
Beltelecom 
 
State logics  
Strongly relying on top-down 
planning, vertical authority and 
decision-making 
 
Reluctant to changes and 
innovations unless they are state-
approved 
 
Seeking to dominate other ISPs as 
potentially threating the company 
performance leadership and 
access to government distribution 
of resources 
³1DWLRQDO´
provider 
 
Conflicts 
with actors 
from 
different 
social 
groups (e.g., 
market and 
community) 
Technologies serving 
the needs of citizens 
declared by the 
government 
 
Innovations and 
technologies requiring 
top-down approval 
 
Relying on government as a 
distributor of funds and 
resources 
 
Using expensive resources 
that enable the company 
monopoly 
 
Adjusting capabilities to fit 
the evolving state 
performance indicators 
ISPs 
 
Market 
logics 
Decision-making based on market 
analysis 
 
Organizing and selecting partners 
based on profit maximization 
 
Seeking to increase market shares 
Market 
players 
driven by 
profit 
 
 
Technology serving the 
needs of dominant users 
 
Technology investments 
based on the market 
demand and 
competitive aims 
Resources generated by 
profit 
 
Developing capabilities to 
generate competitive 
advantage 
 
WestLAN 
XSpider 
Zizeron 
1 
1 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
HomeNet ISPs 4 7 
UNET 
FlyNet 
OneNet 
'RPDVKQD\D6HW¶ 
LifeNet 
Netberry 
- 
- 
- 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
Corporate ISPs 10 4 
Solo 
Atlanttelecom 
Aichyna 
ADSL.by 
ɇɂɄɋ 
Next 
IP TelCom 
'HORYD\D6HW¶ 
3 
- 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Beltelecom 2 2 
Engineer 1 
Marketing director 
Engineer 2 
Engineer 3 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
1 
Experts in the field: - 4 
S Jay, creator of 
Homenets.tut.by 
Alex K, popular blogger 
on ISP and HomeNets 
from 2005-2011 
UNDP consultant for 
Internet in Belarus for 20 
years, author of e-
belarus.org 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Total 
75 22 
97 
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Adjusting infrastructure 
to maximize profits 
IURPVHUYLQJXVHUV¶
needs 
Using platforms in 
attracting resources beyond 
the original ISP boundaries 
 
Orchestrating the behavior 
of partners to increase profit  
HomeNets 
 
Community 
logics 
Based on volunteer contributions 
and self-selected roles 
 
Group membership 
 
Seeking to generate innovations 
to create social value 
 
Community values of reciprocity, 
trust, and unity of will 
 
Community 
of residents 
Technology serving the 
needs of residents 
 
Profoundly social 
nature of innovations 
and infrastructures 
 
IT services and 
infrastructures are 
collectively owned, 
developed and used  
Shared resources and costs 
 
Resources generated by 
bricolage and collective 
funding of community 
members 
HomeNet 
ISPs 
 
Hybrid 
(community 
and market) 
logics 
Firms with community values 
 
Seeking to be competitive while 
relying on community values 
Community
-driven 
market 
players 
Technology serving the 
needs of residents 
 
Innovations that is both 
competitive and 
valuable for members 
Shared resources between 
community members and 
with other HomeNet ISPs 
Intensive member 
participation in resource 
and capability creation  
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Table 3. Key Processes, Characteristics and Outcomes of Symbiotic and Parasitic Interactions 
 
Interaction description Factors driving the 
interaction 
development 
DI agency Actor technologies Type of 
ecological 
interplay 
Orchestration between 
participating actors 
DI outcome 
Sy
m
bi
ot
ic
 g
en
er
a
tiv
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
Interactions of existing actors in 
the ecology are non-orchestrated, 
rely on contesting state and 
market logics and disjoined 
coexisting diverse technologies 
that serve specific group of users 
while ignoring others. Such 
ignorance generates a new DI 
actor via indirect ecological 
impacts: the ignored users rely on 
a distinctive disjointed technology 
and a contesting community 
logics to collectively develop an 
innovative infrastructure to adapt 
to the lack of existing IT solutions  
Indirect ecological 
impacts generates 
an emergent new 
actor who develops 
DI 
Self-organized 
DI actor relies 
on distinctive 
community 
logics and 
disjointed 
technologies 
Ex.: HomeNet 
communities 
Diverse separate 
technologies specific 
to each actor  
Ex: dial-up 
technologies by 
Beltelecom; satellite-
based Internet access 
by ISPs; dial-up DIY 
infrastructure by 
HomeNets 
Indirect  
interactions 
between the 
generated actor 
and other actors in 
the field  
Ex: no direct 
interactions 
between 
HomeNets and 
other ISPs and 
Beltelecom  
No orchestration and 
coordination between 
actors, no laws 
FRRUGLQDWLQJDFWRUV¶
interactions, 
DV\QFKURQLHVLQDFWRUV¶
capabilities and 
resources 
Adaptive alternative  
and disjointed DI 
solution by an 
emergent DI actor  
Ex.: HomeNet 
residential 
infrastructures 
Sy
m
bi
ot
ic
 m
u
tu
a
lis
tic
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
A new regulation introduced on 
one of the actors opens its 
strategy to a nontypical partner 
based on a new technology. The 
ecology of metaorganization 
emerges in the course of an 
unlikely partnership where actors 
develop an innovative DI solution 
through mutually dependent 
capabilities and shared 
technologies yet maintaining their 
authority and following their own 
motivations and logics  
New state 
regulation 
introduces 
interdependencies 
between previously 
unconnected 
heterogenous actors 
New technology 
enables confluence 
between diverse 
technologies of 
previously 
unconnected actors  
Metaorganizatio
n of actors with 
contesting 
community and 
market logics 
and diverse 
shared 
technologies 
Ex.: HomeNet ± 
ISP networks 
Codeveloped, 
commonly shared and 
interdepend 
technologies 
Ex.: ISPs and 
HomeNets build on 
codeveloped but 
independently 
managed HomeNet 
services, ISP 
intranets, services 
through shared 
modems provided by 
ISPs 
Direct 
collaboration 
between actors in 
meta-organization  
Ex: HomeNets 
and ISPs 
intensively 
interact 
Mutually adaptive 
interactions in  
metaorganization and 
regulations stimulating 
an unlikely actor 
partnership into a 
metaorganization  
Ex.: ISPs and 
HomeNets orchestrate 
and cultivate each 
RWKHU¶VEHKDYLRU,63
dependence on 
Beltelecom 
infrastructure following 
the state regulation 
DI solution based 
on shared and 
codeveloped 
technologies by a 
metaorganization 
Ex.: HomeNet ± ISP 
residential 
infrastructures 
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7DEOHFRQW¶G 
 Interaction description Factors driving the 
interaction 
development 
DI agency Actor technologies  Orchestration between 
participating actors 
DI outcome 
Pa
ra
sit
ic
 c
o
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
Emerges when a technologically 
advanced but ultimately 
unsuccessful in reaching end 
users, infrastructural innovation 
that is developed by the primary 
innovator gets complemented by 
a parasitizing IT solution by 
another DI actor. This allows 
innovative infrastructure to scale 
beyond the tipping point but 
outside the control of the original 
innovator in a largely unregulated 
area  
 
New technology 
(e.g. WiFi) enables 
confluence between 
technologies of 
previously 
unconnected 
heterogenous actors 
with contesting 
logics 
Parasitizing 
interplay of two 
heterogenous DI 
actors with 
contesting 
logics whereby 
one actor feeds 
on innovative 
solution 
developed by 
another actor  
 
Unprompted mesh 
network that builds on 
DFWRUV¶SDUWO\VKDUHG
technologies  
Ex.: HomeNet 
members share ByFly 
Internet access via 
Wi-Fi networks and 
HomeNet 
infrastructures to 
access Internet and 
community services 
(e.g., games and 
chats) 
Indirect 
interactions based 
on partly shared/ 
technology 
parasitizing  
DQRWKHUDFWRUV¶
innovation 
Ex: Internet from 
ByFly WiFi 
networks shared 
via HomeNet 
infrastructures 
No regulations between 
the parasitized and 
parasitizing actors 
Ex.: No specific 
regulations of the 
interplays between 
Beltelecom and 
HomeNet actors; no 
specific Wi-Fi network 
regulations by the state 
DI solution based 
on parasitizing 
(making partly 
shared) another 
DFWRU¶V,7
innovation 
Ex.: Beltelecom 
Internet solutions 
latently shared via 
HomeNet 
infrastructures 
Pa
ra
sit
ic
 c
o
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
Emerges when a heterogeneous 
set of actors compete for 
leaderships and domination in a 
new technology that has 
idiosyncratic value in their logics 
and games and stimulates 
independent innovative solutions. 
Regulations further stimulate 
DFWRUV¶LQGHSHQGHQWVWUDWHJLHV
leading exploitation and 
dissolution of some 
organizational actors as well as 
the emergence of new actors 
New technology 
enables independent 
solutions;  
Intensive 
regulations 
stimulate 
independencies 
Heterogenous 
actors with 
contesting 
logics who 
develop similar 
innovations 
while 
competing and 
feeding on each 
other 
Coexisting similar 
technologies with no 
interdependencies 
Ex.: Coexisting 
multiple Internet 
access options (fiber 
optic, ADSL, and 
wireless) proposed by 
Beltelecom, ISPs and 
HomeNet ISPs  
Direct mutually 
competitive 
interplay between 
all actors 
Ex.: ISPs, 
HomeNet ISPs 
and Beltelecom 
competing with 
similar 
technologies  
Exploitative interactions 
between all actors in the 
ecology 
Ex.: Strict regulations of 
Internet infrastructure 
development and 
intensive government 
interventions into the 
interplay of Beltelecom, 
ISPs, and HomeNets 
Similar DI solutions 
developed by 
multiple 
heterogenous actors  
Ex.: Actors develop 
similar fiber optic, 
ADSL, and wireless 
infrastructure with 
similar services 
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Figure 4. Model of Symbiotic and Parasitic Interactions Shaping Digital Infrastructure Development by 
Heterogenous Actors with Contesting Logics and Diverse Technologies  
 
